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In “The Family: Crucial to and Divisive in Bioethics,” leading 
bioethicist and philosopher Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. offers erudite and 
compelling arguments for the Conservative View 2 that the traditional 
family is an important good to people and that it has significant impact on 
society as well as on bioethics. On the other hand, he undermines the kind 
of Individualism3 prevalent in many societies today.  
Personally, I would to a great extent4 endorse the Conservative View, 
and I would personally find it difficult to live with a partner who embraces 
the Individualist View. That said, I should not be responding to 
Engelhardt’s thoughtful and inspiring paper, if all that matter were our 
personal self-regarding views.  
?
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When Obama was running for re-election in November 2012, 
vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan and Vice-president Joe Biden had a 
debate. Responding to a question on abortion, Ryan said that being Irish 
and Catholic he would support laws to prohibit abortion. However, Biden 
responded that, though being Irish and Catholic he would personally be 
against abortion, he would not seek laws to ban abortion. Biden’s view is 
nuanced and attractive. What he is relying on, if not explicitly spelled out, 
is the idea of public reason: Catholics have a religious, metaphysical and 
????????????????????? 
 
????????XI:2 (2013?) ?? 153-160? 
© Copyright 2013 by Global Scholarly Publications. 
 
(1) I would like to thank Andrew Brennan, Yong Huang, Franz Mang, and especially Peter 
Chau for comments on the penultimate draft of this paper. I also thank the Editor for 
comments, and for allowing me not to accept some of his suggestions. 
 
(2) Engelhardt calls this the “ontological or metaphysical” account of the family. 
 
(3) I do not follow Engelhardt in labeling this view as the “Liberal-Libertarian account,” if 
only because a liberal can endorse the Conservative View of the family. I think the 
main underlying spirit of this view is individualism.  
 
(4) But see part III below.  
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hence “nonpublic reason”5 to be against abortion. Non-Catholics might 
have no such reasons to be against abortion. Thus, a Catholic’s reason 
against abortion is largely6 a religious reason, something that cannot be 
shared by non-Catholics.  
A public reason, on the other hand, does not rely on any religious, 
metaphysical, philosophical, or controversial doctrines. Because it does 
not rely on any controversial doctrine, it is “freestanding” 7. Moreover, it 
is public and shareable because it is accessible by anyone who is 
reasonable.  
Grounded on the idea of public reason, we should object to the state 
which employs material incentives or other means to entice people into 
having a traditional family on the grounds that this is part of a good life, or 
to discourage or penalize those seeking an individualist lifestyle. Although 
Engerhardt stops short of saying that the state should promote the idea of a 
traditional family by any of these means, “state perfectionists” who agree 
with his view on the family might make this point. It is therefore worth 
spelling out why the state should not do so.  
According to Engelhardt, it is good for individuals as well as society 
that people get married in the traditional way, stay in marriage, have 
children, and let children be under the parents’ authority, etc. On the other 
hand, he believes the following groups of people would live a less good 
life: people who do not get married, those who get married but later 
divorce, those who cohabit8 as well as perhaps those who get married but 
decide not to have children. Perhaps those who would like to have children 
but are unable to, as well as those (such as Kant) who practice celibacy, 
could be viewed as living a less good life. (Engelhardt also places 
emphasis on the fact that children born out of the wedlock are more likely 
to have problems of various kinds.9 But I do not have room here to discuss 
this later claim. Nor shall discuss various implications of the family on 
bioethics.)  
(5)  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
p.220. 
 
(6) I am not saying that a Catholic cannot be against abortion on a ground unconnected to 
Catholicism, as he or she may accept the view expressed in Don Marquis, “Why 
Abortion is Immoral,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (Apr 1989), pp.183-202. Nor am 
I saying that a non-Catholic cannot be against abortion. However, insofar as a Catholic 
believes that a fetus is a person because the Pope says so, his/her ground and the 
non-Catholic’s ground against abortion would come from different sources.  
 
(7) John Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
 
(8) The line between marriage and cohabitation is now blurred because in a growing 
number of jurisdictions (e.g., England, USA) would consider cohabitation as a type of 
common-law marriage.  
 
(9) See Note 8.     
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The idea of public reason,10 according to John Rawls, is that the 
constitutional fundamentals and basic justice in a society can be decided 
by reference to political values that are independent of people’s religious, 
metaphysical, and philosophical views, insofar as there is an “overlapping 
consensus” 11 on these values. Thus, a law is legitimate if it can be 
justified to those who are in reasonable disagreement over the meaning of 
life, the kind of freedom that people should strive for, as well as what 
constitutes a good life, viz. what Rawls terms “comprehensive 
doctrines” 12. This is because, Rawls thinks, matters of basic justice should 
not include values that are part of some reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, but not others 13.  
Seen from the perspective of public reason, strategies by the state to 
reward those who have the traditional family, or to discourage or penalize 
those who practice the individualistic lifestyles would be unjust, since the 
disagreement over the family would seem to be reasonable. This is 
because the state would support values of some reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine, viz. the Conservative View, but not those of the Individualist 
View. It is also because if a state does so, it would be disrespectful of those 
who do not share the state’s prescribed conception of what a good life is.14   
?
?
?
(10) The idea of public reason was used earlier by Hobbes, Rosseau and Kant. 
 
(11)  John Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
 
(12) John Rawls, Political Liberalism. 
 
(13) John Rawls, Political Liberalism; T. M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Samuel Freeman, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Burton Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Samuel Freeman, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Samuel Freeman, Rawls (Oxon, UK & New York: Routledge, 
2007). 
 
(14) Jonathan Quong, "Public Reason," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., retrieved on 10 September, 2013: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/;  
Joseph Raz, “Disagreement in Politics,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence: An 
International Forum for Legal Philosophy 43 (1998), pp.25–52; Steven Wall, 
"Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., retrieved on 10 September, 
2013: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/perfectionism-moral/. Raz 
argues that if we disagree with some people’s (mistaken) conception of good life, we do 
not necessarily disrespect them. However, from the perspective of public reason, the 
disagreement in question here is ex hypothesi “reasonable” (John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism). Consider this analogy: You invite friends to your home for dinner. 
Knowing that although some friends love spicy food whereas others do not like them, 
almost all dishes you cooked are quite spicy. Might your friends who dislike spicy food 
feel slighted, at least, and even disrespected especially if you try to persuade them that 
spicy food is good for them?   
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Engelhardt believes that the traditional family is a structure “that all 
families should try to realize.”15 Let us now turn to the question whether 
having a traditional family is a good to everyone, and whether those who 
have decided not to have a traditional family could be persuaded 
otherwise. 
If the traditional family is a good that all families should try to realize, 
then it is a universal good, that is, a good that can be justified to people 
with different nature, ability, need, preferences, disposition, or 
perspectives. For instance, if having a traditional family were a universal 
good, it would be justifiable not only to people who want to get married 
and stay in the marriage and have children, but also to the following 
categories of people: (1) those who need to divorce, (2) spouses who do 
not intend to have children because they have careers or projects, or 
simply because they prefer not to be burdened with the onerous burden of 
raising children, (3) those who practice celibacy, (4) heterosexuals who 
prefer to have a free lifestyle,16 (5) homosexuals, (6) lesbians, (7) those 
who biologically cannot have children, (8) those who financially cannot 
afford to have children. Can the idea that having a traditional family is a 
good be justified to these eight categories of people? The answer is:  
Surely not all of them.  
Suppose you like classical music, but you cannot play any instrument. 
While you enjoy listening to classical music, you cannot take part in or 
appreciate classical music the way that a pianist or a violinist can. 
Nevertheless, classical music is a good to you. This would be very roughly 
analogous to the case where someone who cannot or do not have children, 
but nevertheless enjoys the traditional family, if vicariously: When she 
visits her brother’s family, she enjoys playing with his children. If 
Engelhardt is successful, he may be able to persuade some who would 
have opted not to have any children, or not to get married, to rethink the 
whole idea.17  
Now suppose someone tells you that heavy rock music or Cantonese 
Opera is terrific, whereas you hate it so much that you would get a 
(15) Engelhardt raises the question: “Is there a structure that all families should try to realize, 
or is it the case that humans can structure the family as they wish without important 
social and moral costs?” It is clear that he thinks that there is a structure, viz. the 
traditional family, that all families should try to realize. 
(16) These include people who get married after divorce, those who prefer to engage serial 
monogamy, as well as those who live a promiscuous sexual life.  
 
 
(17) However, I am not optimistic. For one thing, the kind of arguments Engelhardt 
advances mainly appeal to consequences, rather than the intrinsic good of having 
children. If he says more about the intrinsic good of having children, he may be more 
successful in persuading those who have decided not to have children.  
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headache after listening to it for more than a minute. This is analogous to a 
case where someone who simply dislikes children. In this case, having a 
traditional family is not an intrinsic good to you at all.  
Next suppose you don’t dislike heavy rock or Cantonese Opera, but 
you cannot possibly afford the costs of attending a concert featuring heavy 
rock or Cantonese Opera. This would be analogous to the case where 
someone who abhors the idea of having to bear or bring up a child, or to 
sacrifice her cherished career, or to give it up for some altruistic concern 
that clashes with having a traditional family (e.g., she works for Médecins 
Sans Frontières). In this case, having a traditional family is everything 
considered not a good to her.  
Therefore, while there are many people lucky enough to have a 
compatible spouse and be able to raise happy children, this does not show 
that having a traditional family is a universal good.18 Nor is it easy to 
persuade those who have decided not to have children to form traditional 
families.19  
?
????
?
While I personally and rather unreflectively agree with Engelhardt’s 
idea of the traditional family (since I myself have a traditional family), let 
me step back from this vantage point and reflect on this idea from a more 
detached standpoint. According to Engelhardt, the traditional family is 
grounded on certain traditional values, such as the norm that parents have 
authority over children. Moreover, he claims that the family cannot be 
reduced into individual members but must be regarded as a whole, and that 
individual needs are subordinated to the need of the family.20 Finally, he is 
against the “egalitarian aspirations” of liberalism.   
I assume that ideally members in a family should be analogous to 
members in a jazz band in that each would perform his or her individual 
task, but all together would coordinate in the larger enterprise, so that the 
(18) While certain conceptions of the good might be uncontroversially seen to be superior to 
other conceptions, when a comparison is carried out locally (Joseph Chan ???, 
“Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29:1 
(Winter 2000), pp.13-14), the issue of the family is not uncontroversial.  
 
(19) The point is that in order for moral prescriptions to make sense, we must consider the 
perspectives of those whom the prescription is addressed, or else such prescription 
would not make sense from their perspectives. For an account of this idea, viz. how 
public reason is applicable to social morality, see Gerald F. Gaus, The Order of Public 
Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.205-232, esp.184.  
 
(20) I infer this from Engelhardt’s disapproval of the following: “... there is an accent on the 
pursuit of individual self-fulfillment in preference to the flourishing of the family as a 
whole.”  
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whole is greater - and richer - than the sum of its parts.21 In this analogy 
each individual’s development is flourishingly realized while the whole is 
also promoted and enhanced.  
How close is the traditional family to this admittedly ideal 
conception? If we look more closely into the traditional family as it is, we 
see that in both China and America, too often the career of the wife is 
sacrificed in order to take care of the family, even should she hold an 
advanced degree from a prestigious university or a professional 
qualification in accountancy, law, or medicine. On the other hand, one 
rarely sees the reverse, where the man sacrifices his career so that his wife 
can flourish in hers.  
According to research conducted by Plagnol and Easterlin, 
“[w]omen end up less happy than men,” because in later life it is “men 
who come closer to fulfilling their aspirations, are more satisfied with their 
family lives and financial situations, and are the happier of the two.”22  In 
another study, it is shown that “[w]omen [are] happier than men after 
divorce.”23 Finally, the National Marriage Project at Rutgers found that 
two-thirds of all divorces are initiated by women.24 The findings in these 
studies corroborate with each other to form the picture that women are 
generally less happy than men after marriage, and therefore that they 
(more than men) are more inclined toward initiating a divorce. What 
accounts for this phenomenon? The obvious explanation is that more 
women have sacrificed their possible career for the family, whereas more 
men flourish in having a traditional family where their wives take care of 
the children and (almost) everything else.25 It is true that, like any other 
theory in this area, this explanation is conjectural, but it is one that is too 
uncomfortable to ignore. 
(21) I take this analogy of the jazz band from G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A 
Defence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), where he argues that 
members of a classless society should be like members in a jazz band. 
(22) For details, see Anke C. Plagnol & Richard A. Easterlin, “Aspirations, Attainments, and 
Satisfaction: Life Cycle Differences Between American Women and Men,” Journal of 
Happiness Studies, 9:4 (Dec 2008), pp. 601, 613-615. 
 
(23) See Andrew E. Clark & Yannis Georgellis, “Back to Baseline in Britain: Adaptation in 
the British Household Panel Survey,” Economica, 80:319 (2013), pp. 504-505; Or see 
Theresa Boyle (Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd.) reported, “Women happier than men 
after divorce, study finds”, retrieved on 10 September, 2013:  
http://www.thestar.com/life/2013/07/11/marital_split_women_happier_after_divorce 
study.html. 
  
(24) David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, “The Top Ten Myths of Divorce 
 (Information brief),”  from the National Marriage Project’s Ten Things to Know Series 
 (Apr 2001), available at: 
  http://nationalmarriageweekusa.net/images/research/MythsDivorce.pdf. 
 
(25) See Note 24 for the study that supports this conclusion.  
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On Rawls’ view, the family is part of the basic structure, and there 
should be “equality of opportunity” for both genders 26. That such equality 
does not obtain is too obvious, as “a long and historic injustice to women 
is that they have borne, and continue to bear, a disproportionate share of 
the task of raising, nurturing and caring for their children”.27  
More than three decades ago, Thomas Nagel said to me from 
nowhere 28  and without further explanation: “The greatest injustice 
happens within the family.” I did not ask for further explanation, but I 
have been left puzzled since then as to what he really meant and why he 
said it. I think I may be beginning to see what he had in mind. 
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